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I. INTRODUCTION 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held the 
Second Amendment prohibits the federal government from banning 
handguns.1 Following Heller, application of the Second Amendment 
to state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment seemed 
likely. Although the Amendment’s Framers largely believed it would 
require states to uphold the individual liberties outlined in the Bill of 
Rights, state governments have not been required to do so following 
the Supreme Court’s decision in the Slaughter-House Cases. 2 
The Court’s grant of certiorari in McDonald v. City of Chicago,3 
however, could signal a departure from the Slaughter-House 
precedent.4 McDonald will consider whether the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporate the right to keep and bear arms, making the 
right binding against state governments.5 If the Court applies the 
Second Amendment to the states through the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause and overturns Slaughter-House, the decision could 
throw the existing substantive due process framework into disarray 
because many rights would apply through both the Due Process and 
Privileges or Immunities clauses.6 The Court, however, may use 
*2011 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. I would like to thank Prof. Joseph 
Blocher for his invaluable help in researching and drafting this comment. 
 1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008). 
 2. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873). 
 3. McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1521 (U.S. argued Mar. 2, 2010). 
 4. See Randy Barnett, Predicting McDonald, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, Nov. 19, 2009, 
http://volokh.com/2009/11/18/predicting-the-mcdonald/ (discussing the implication of certiorari 
in McDonald v. Chicago). 
 5. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, McDonald, No. 08-1521 (U.S. Jun. 9, 2009). 
 6. See generally David Kopel, Privilege or Immunity Extravaganza, THE VOLOKH 
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McDonald to clarify the existing Privileges or Immunities and Due 
Process jurisprudence, which is presently in a state of confusion.7 
Regardless of the specific outcome, McDonald will likely solidify the 
legacy of the post-Civil War constitutional amendments on civil 
liberties. 
II. FACTS 
Chicago introduced firearm regulations that effectively banned 
handguns.8 In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held 
that the Second Amendment prohibits the federal government from 
banning handguns kept at home.9 Immediately following Heller, Otis 
McDonald initiated an action challenging several long-standing 
Chicago ordinances that largely banned handgun possession within 
city limits. McDonald claimed that the Chicago ordinances violated 
his Second Amendment right to bear arms as applied to state and 
local governments by the Fourteenth Amendment.10 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois11 followed Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, a 1982 Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals opinion that held that state and local 
governments are not required to recognize the right to bear arms.12 
The Seventh Circuit similarly declined to overrule its precedent in 
Quilici.13 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
CONSPIRACY, Dec. 21, 2009, http://volokh.com/2009/12/21/privileges-or-immunities-
extravaganza/ (assessing the impact of a revived privileges or immunities clause on substantive 
due process). 
 7. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 528 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Court should consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause 
should replace substantive due process and equal protection jurisprudence given that the 
current form encourages courts to invent new rights). 
 8. See CHICAGO, ILL., CHICAGO MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 8-20-040(a), 8-20-050(c), 8-20-
090(a), 8-20-200(a), 8-20-200(c) (2009) (forbidding possession of any unregistered firearm while 
denying registration of most handguns and denying registration of any firearm if the owner fails 
to annually register the firearm). 
 9. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008). 
 10. Brief for the Petitioners at 3, McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1521 (U.S. Nov. 16, 
2009). 
 11. NRA v. City of Chicago, 617 F. Supp.2d 752, 754 (N.D. Ill. 2008).  The Seventh Circuit 
reviewed a district court decision with the NRA as the lead plaintiff.  The Supreme Court, 
however, granted certiorari to Petitioner McDonald’s claim, instead of the NRA’s case. 
 12. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 271 (7th Cir. 1982) (relying on Presser 
v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (holding the Second Amendment applies only to the federal 
government and does not subject state regulations to constitutional scrutiny)). 
 13. See NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 860 (7th Cir. 2009). The Seventh Circuit 
consolidated Petitioner McDonald’s case with an identical case brought by the NRA, and the 
NRA appeared as the lead appellant below. 
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whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms applies 
to the states through either the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privilege or 
Immunities Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.14 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
If the Court incorporates the Second Amendment, it could do so 
either through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities 
Clause or through the Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  In either 
case, the Court’s consideration will be influenced by its recent 
decision in Heller. 
A.  Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities 
Following the Civil War, proponents of equal rights sought to 
create federal protections for fundamental civil liberties. Before the 
Civil War, the Supreme Court had opined that fundamental rights 
enjoy no federal protection in three separate cases. Corfield v. Coryell 
held the Article IV  Privileges and Immunities Clause only creates a 
federal cause of action where a state extends a right to its citizens 
while denying the right to citizens of other states.15 Barron v. Mayor of 
Baltimore held that the Bill of Rights does not apply to state 
governments.16 Scott v. Sanford, commonly referred to as the Dred 
Scott opinion, held that there are two distinct forms of citizenship in 
America—state and federal—and states retain discretion in extending 
fundamental rights to their citizens.17 
After the war, Northern Republicans sought to remedy the 
perceived ills of Corfield, Barron and Dred Scott by creating a federal 
cause of action around individual liberties.18 To that end, Congress 
conditioned readmission to the Union on the southern states’ 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.19 Despite initial optimism 
 14. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at i. 
 15. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). Corfield considered 
an Article Four Privileges and Immunities challenge, id., which is distinct from the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
 16. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833). 
 17. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405 (1856). 
 18. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 41 (1986) (stating that 
“perhaps the most common Republican refrain of the Thirty-Ninth Congress was that life, 
liberty and property of American citizens must be protected against denial by the states”). 
 19. Id. at 36 (discussing the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment). In pertinent 
part, the Fourteenth Amendment provides: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
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regarding the Fourteenth Amendment’s ability to safeguard 
individual liberties, the Supreme Court quickly decided otherwise. In 
the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court ruled the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause only protects rights 
accruing under federal citizenship, which are distinct from the 
fundamental rights inherent in state citizenship.20 
In dicta, the Court in Slaughter-House described the federal rights 
codified by the Privileges or Immunities Clause as those “which owe 
their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its 
Constitution, or its laws.”21 These include access to government, the 
right to run for elected office, access to seaports, and access to 
courts.22 This limited field of rights protected by the Clause falls short 
of the fundamental rights envisioned by many of the Amendment’s 
drafters.23 
Though explicitly recognizing the historical moment in which the 
Reconstruction-era amendment was adopted,24 Slaughter-House 
placed seemingly equal weight on the principle of textual 
interpretation that requires explicit language to create federal causes 
of action against the state governments.25 Specifically, the Court 
explained that for an amendment to shift protection of civil rights 
from the States to the Federal government would require “language 
which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt.”26 This 
language directly parallels the pre-Civil War Barron decision in which 
the Court held the Bill of Rights does not apply to the states.27 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 20. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873). 
 21. Id. at 79. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 14, 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1521 (U.S. Nov. 23, 2009) (noting most Congressional 
representatives understood Privileges or Immunities to encompass “protection by the 
Government, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of 
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety”) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. 
Cas. 546, 551–52 (E.D. PA 1823) (No. 3,230)). 
 24. See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 68 (stating that “those who had succeeded in 
re-establishing the authority of the Federal government were not content to permit this great act 
of emancipation to rest on the actual results of the contest or the proclamation of the Executive 
. . . and they determined to place this main and most valuable result in the Constitution of the 
restored Union . . . .”). 
 25. Id. at 78. 
 26. Id. at 76–78. 
 27. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) (holding that if 
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Following Slaughter-House, the Court largely reverted back to its 
pre-Civil War approach to federalism. In United States v. Cruikshank, 
the Court reaffirmed that neither the Second Amendment nor the 
Privilege or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limit 
state governments’ power to regulate firearms.28 As the Court later 
explained in Presser v. Illinois, a general right to bear arms is a 
fundamental privilege inherent in state citizenship, but the Fourteenth 
Amendment only creates federal protection for rights accruing to 
national citizenship.29 Because fundamental rights predate the 
Constitution, they are not inherent in national citizenship, thus not 
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.30 
For the most part, the Court has upheld a limited view of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privilege or Immunities Clause.31 However, 
the Court has recently begun to interpret the Clause as protecting 
some fundamental rights, perhaps indicating a departure from the 
Slaughter-House precedent. In Saenz v. Roe, the Court interpreted the 
Clause as providing federal protection for the right to travel.32 
Although Justice Thomas dissented from this opinion, he agreed that 
the meaning of the Clause should be reconsidered in “the appropriate 
case.”33 
B.  Modern Selective Incorporation Through Due Process 
Beginning in the 20th century, the Court has increasingly 
recognized specific, constitutional rights as binding and protected 
from intrusion by both the federal and state government through the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In Twining v. New 
Jersey, the Court recognized the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process clause as a potential source of substantive rights: “It is 
possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded against National 
action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial 
of them would be a denial of due process.”34 In Palko v. Connecticut,35 
Congress had intended to apply Bill of Rights to the states “they would have declared this 
purpose in plain and intelligible language”). 
 28. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553–55 (1876). 
 29. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1885). 
 30. Id. at 267. 
 31. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 90–91 (1940) (stating that “[t]he privileges and 
immunities clause protects all citizens against abridgment by states of rights of national 
citizenship as distinct from the fundamental or natural rights inherent in state citizenship”). 
 32. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 498, 503 (1999). 
 33. Id. at 528 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 34. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908). In Twining, the Court held that the right 
to be free of self-incrimination was neither a privilege or immunity of U.S. citizens nor inherent 
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the Court established the “selective incorporation” test, which later 
provided a vehicle for applying much of the Bill of Rights to state 
actions: 
[I]mmunities that are valid as against the federal government by 
force of the specific pledges of particular amendments have been 
found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the 
states.36 
Following Palko, the Court incorporated nearly every right 
embodied in the first eight Amendments.37 The Court, however, later 
refined Palko’s “concept of ordered liberty” standard, now 
incorporating provisions of the Bill of Rights if the right is 
“fundamental to the American scheme of justice.”38 
 Although Cruikshank’s holding that the Second Amendment 
does not apply to the states is specific precedent binding the lower 
courts, the Cruikshank decision was written forty-two years prior to 
Twining’s recognition that the Due Process Clause could incorporate 
the Bill of Rights against the states. The modern Court has yet to 
consider whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear 
arms is fundamental right. 
C.  District of Columbia v. Heller 
In 2008, the Court considered whether a federal law prohibiting 
handguns in the District of Columbia violated the Second 
Amendment.39 The District of Columbia argued that the Second 
Amendment protected the right to bear arms only in connection with 
militia service. 40  The respondents, however, asserted that the 
Amendment protected an individual right unconnected to militia 
purposes.41 In ruling that the right to bear arms accrues to individuals 
regardless of militia purposes, the Court first confronted the Second 
in due process and therefore could be abridged by the states. Id. at 113-14. 
 35. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
 36. Id. at 324–25 (1937) (emphasis added). 
 37. See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 653 
(1989) (stating that “the obvious question, given the modern legal reality of the incorporation of 
almost all of the rights protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments, is 
what exactly justifies treating the Second Amendment as the great exception?”). 
 38. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
 39. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2787–88 (2008). 
 40. Id. at 2789 (citing to Amendment’s prefatory clause as indicating purpose to guard 
states against federal intervention but not to create an individual right). 
 41. Id. 
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Amendment’s prefatory clause: “A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State . . . .” The Court held that the 
prefatory clause serves a “clarifying function” but does not otherwise 
“limit or expand the scope of [the right announced in] the operative 
clause.”42 Using this interpretation, and after examining the Second 
Amendment’s historical background, the Court held that the Second 
Amendment protects a preexisting, individual right to bear arms 
unconnected with militia purposes.43 
After recognizing this right, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of the District of Columbia’s ban on handguns. The 
Court upheld precedent protecting a right to bear arms commonly 
used for lawful purposes like self-defense.44 The Court found the D.C. 
law prohibiting an “entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly 
chosen by American Society for [the] lawful purpose” of self-defense 
to be an unconstitutional violation of the Second Amendment.45 The 
Court rested its decision on the popularity of the weapon at issue—a 
handgun—and explicitly declined to provide a standard of review for 
lower courts to weigh individuals’ Second Amendment rights against 
a state’s interest in regulating weapons to preserve safety.46 
IV. HOLDING 
The Seventh Circuit held the Second Amendment is not binding 
on state and local governments.47 First, the Seventh Circuit quickly 
dismissed the prospect of overturning the Slaughter-House Cases by 
interpreting the right to bear arms as protected by the Privileges or 
Immunities clause.48 Second, the Seventh Circuit declined to hold that 
the Second Amendment was binding on state governments through 
the modern selective incorporation framework.49 The plaintiffs 
acknowledged that Supreme Court precedent—Cruikshank, Presser, 
and Miller—rejects the application of the Second Amendment to 
 42. Id. at 2789. 
 43. Id. at 2822–23. 
 44. See id. at 2821–22.  See also United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 175 (1939) 
(considering whether the Second Amendment contemplated the right to carry a sawed-off 
shotgun across state line). 
 45. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818 (“It is enough to note, as we have observed, that the 
American people have considered the handgun to be the quintessential self-defense weapon.”). 
 46. Id. at 2821 (“[Justice Breyer] criticizes us for declining to establish a level of scrutiny 
for evaluating Second Amendment restrictions . . . . A constitutional guarantee subject to future 
judge’s assessments of its usefulness is not constitutional guarantee at all.”). 
 47. NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 860 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 48. Id. at 857. 
 49. Id. at 860. 
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state governments.50 Still, they urged the court to engage in Palko’s 
incorporation analysis and dismiss the precedent as outdated.51 The 
Seventh Circuit, however, rebuffed the plaintiffs’ arguments for 
selective incorporation. In doing so the court noted it was bound to 
follow specific precedent regardless of whether the analysis was 
perceived as outdated.52 It noted Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller 
remain good law after Heller53 and that the Supreme Court has not 
shown any intention of incorporating all the amendments by 
overruling Slaughter-House.54 
In dicta, the Seventh Circuit speculated that despite Heller’s 
characterization of the right to bear arms as an individual right, the 
right embodied in the Second Amendment may apply differently to 
state governments than to the federal government.55 The court offered 
two scenarios to support its hypothesis that the right may allow state 
governments to act where the federal government could not. First, a 
state could decide private ownership of long guns, as opposed to 
handguns, was best suited for a public militia.56  A state ban on 
handguns would therefore be permissible under the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation of the Heller decision.57 
Second, a state could determine the public’s interest in self-
defense is best served by requiring potential victims to surrender and 
let the perpetrator face the criminal justice system rather than fight 
back with handguns.58 The court explained that Heller created Second 
Amendment protection only for the “interests of law-abiding 
 50. Id. at 857. 
 51. See id. at 857 (citing Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 457 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding the 
Second Amendment binding against the states through the Due Process Clause)). 
 52. NRA, 567 F.3d at 857 (citing Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 
(1989) (“If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on 
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case 
which directly controls, leaving this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”)). 
 53. Id. at 858 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008) 
(“[W]ith respect to Cruikshank’s continuing validity on incorporation . . . we note that 
Cruikshank also said that the First Amendment did not apply against the States and did not 
engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases. Our later 
decisions in [Presser and Miller], reaffirmed that the Second Amendment applies only to the 
Federal Government.”)). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 859–60 (“One function of the second amendment is to prevent the national 
government from interfering with state militias. It does this by creating individual rights, Heller 
holds, but those rights may take a different shape when asserted against a state than against the 
national government.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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citizens.”59 According to the Seventh Circuit, if a state banned self-
defense, there would be no right to own a handgun because there 
would no longer be a lawful purpose for its possession.60  Regarding 
the latter hypothetical, the Seventh Circuit emphasized Heller’s 
conclusion that the Second Amendment is only concerned with 
citizens who follow the law.61 If a state banned self-defense, there 
would be no right to own a handgun for purposes of self-defense.62 
V. ANALYSIS 
In holding the Second Amendment does not apply to state 
governments, the Seventh Circuit correctly deferred to binding, 
specific Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court, however, will 
be free to overrule its earlier holdings. 
In addition, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis distorts Heller’s 
description of the Second Amendment right, ignores an implicit right 
to self-defense, and inappropriately regards federalism principles as 
paramount to the right to bear arms. 
A.  Specific Supreme Court Precedent. 
An alternative approach to the Seventh Circuit’s adherence to 
arguably outdated precedent would have been to mimic the approach 
taken by the Ninth Circuit in Nordyke v. King.63 The Ninth Circuit 
justified a departure from precedent by recognizing that the Supreme 
Court has yet to address the possibility of incorporating the Second 
Amendment through the Due Process Clause.64 The Ninth Circuit 
interpreted the Supreme Court’s silence as an opportunity to undergo 
its own incorporation analysis under the Due Process Clause.65 As the 
Seventh Circuit noted, however, reinterpretation at the circuit court 
level is dubious, especially considering three Supreme Court cases 
directly address the issue at hand.66 
 59. Id. at 859. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 457 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 64. Id. at 447. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See NRA, 576 F.3d at 857 (stating that “repeatedly, in decisions that no one thinks 
fossilized, the Justices have directed trial and appellate judges to implement the Supreme 
Court’s holdings even if the reasoning in later opinions has undermined their rationale”). 




B. The Right to Bear Arms May Take a Different Shape Against the 
States. 
The Seventh Circuit’s first hypothetical ignores Heller’s rejection 
of the notion that the Second Amendment is limited by its prefatory 
clause.67 Indeed, the Court in Heller took great pains to note that the 
right to bear arms encompassed much more than gun possession for 
militia purposes.68 As the Second Amendment protects firearms used 
for a variety of purposes, including hunting and self-defense, an 
individual state’s determination of what weapons would best serve 
militia purposes is irrelevant. If the prefatory clause was a limitation 
on the right, the Heller respondent likely would have been denied the 
right to have his handgun because he did not claim its possession for 
militia service.69 
The Seventh Circuit’s second hypothetical distorts two of Heller’s 
premises. First, Heller employed the “law-abiding citizen” language to 
define the types of weapons the Framers intended to protect in 
codifying the Second Amendment.70 The Court determined the 
Framers contemplated the arms “‘in common use at the time’ for 
lawful purposes like self-defense.”71 In defining the protected 
category of arms in this manner, the Court created a framework for 
adapting the Second Amendment right to the modern world. For 
example, Heller does not stand for the proposition that individuals 
have a right to own weapons of mass destruction because these 
weapons are not currently in common use for l
Nowhere in the opinion did the Court indicate the right to own a 
handgun is contingent on a state’s self-defense laws. Although the 
majority noted that the ban on handguns amounted to a categorical 
prohibition on “an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly 
chosen for that lawful purpose [of self-defense],”72 the Court used this 
lawful purpose language under the assumption that a government 
would not and could not ban self-defense.73 In determining whether 
 67. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2794 (2008). 
 68. See id. at 2801. 
 69. See id. at 2788. 
 70. Id. at 2815–16. 
 71. Id. at 2815. 
 72. Id. at 2817. 
 73. Id. (“As the quotations earlier in this opinion demonstrate, the inherent right of self-
defense has been central to the Second Amendment right. The handgun ban amounts to a 
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the ability to “bear arms” applies outside of the militia context, the 
Court looked to the 18th century understanding of the term and 
decided that the phrase was commonly understood to include a right 
of self-defense.74 The Court’s historical analysis in Heller of the 
Framers’ intent does not condition the individual right on modern, 
state-level legislative determinations of whether self-defense is 
appropriate. 
C.  Both Slaughter-House and Federalism Principles Should Guide 
the Second Amendment Incorporation 
Throughout its opinion, the Seventh Circuit adhered to the 
principles of federalism outlined in the Slaughter-House Cases when 
deciding whether the Bill of Rights should apply to the states. 
Although the circuit court’s deference to Supreme Court precedent is 
appropriate, these principles may hold substantially less weight with 
the Supreme Court. 
First, the Seventh Circuit’s axiom that “[f]ederalism is an older 
and more deeply rooted tradition than is a right to carry any 
particular kind of weapon”75 stands contrary to Supreme Court 
precedent. Heller emphasized the right to bear arms predates the 
United States and any of its associated federalism principles: “it has 
always been understood that the Second Amendment . . . codified a 
pre-existing right . . . . ‘[T]his is not a right granted by the Constitution. 
Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its 
existence.’”76 Although the Seventh Circuit may be correct in 
asserting that the right to own a particular weapon is not “deeply 
rooted” in the American scheme of justice, the right to bear arms, 
particularly in self-defense, has long been recognized as one of the 
fundamental rights through which all other libertie
tection.77 
Beyond the Seventh Circuit’s broad federalism concerns, the court 
extends a level of deference to Slaughter-House’s limited view of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that may be revised or overruled at the 
prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for 
that lawful purpose.”). 
 74. Id. at 2793. 
 75. NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 860 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 76. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 at 2797–98 (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 
553 (1876)). 
 77. See Brief for Respondents The Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. in Support of Petitioners 
at 32, McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1521 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2009) (quoting Heller, 128 S. Ct. 
2783 at 2805) (stating right to bear arms may be “true palladium of liberty”). 
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Supreme Court level. First, the Supreme Court’s decision to consider 
whether Chicago’s handgun ban violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause indicates that the 
Court considers the issue undecided. Second, the Court’s recent 
decision in Saenz indicates Slaughter-House did not completely strip 
the Clause of all modern relevance.78 Justice Thomas’ dissent in Saenz, 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, demonstrates a desire to 
reevaluate the Clause’s meaning.79 Finally, in an overwhelming 
consensus, scholars have argued Slaughter-House was wrong on the 
day it was decided.80 This broad coalition, made up of constitutional 
scholars from both ends of the political spectrum, has urged the Court 
to reject Slaughter-House’s interpretation of the Clause in favor of a 
reading that creates 
Argument 
In his brief, Petitioner McDonald devoted sixty-five of seventy-
three pages to his argument that the Court should overrule Slaughter-
House and hold the right to bear arms is a privilege or immunity 
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.82 McDonald framed this 
argument in two stages. First, he argued historical evidence 
demonstrates the phrase “privileges or immunities” was commonly 
understood to encompass both the right to bear arms as well as many 
other fundamental rights.83 Second, McDonald directly confronted 
Slaughter-House, calling for the Court to reject that line of cases.84 
McDonald pointed to the Slaughter-House Court’s failure to give 
appropriate weight to the historical moment in which the 
Amendment was adopted85 and offered a textualist interpretation 
Amendment supporting a more expansive view of the Clause.86 
After establishing that all involved parties understood the 
Fourteenth Amendment to create federal protection around an 
 78. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 510–11 (1999) (holding Fourteenth Amendment 
Privileges or Immunities Clause protects right to travel). 
 79. Id. at 527 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 80. See generally Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, supra note 23 (representing a group of eight distinguished constitutional law 
professors). 
 81. Id. at 10. 
 82. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 10. 
 83. Id. at 9–10. 
 84. Id. at 42. 
 85. Id. at 51–52. 
 86. Id. at 53–54. 
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 evidence to the contrary—struck McDonald as particularly 
dub
ent cloak those Article IV liberties with 
fed
 
expansive set of liberties, McDonald argued that Slaughter-House was 
incorrectly decided and should now be overturned. The brief focused 
on Slaughter-House’s holding that the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
only protects those rights inherent in federal citizenship.87 According 
to McDonald, the Slaughter-House majority’s request that Congress 
more clearly demonstrate an intent to shift protection of civil rights to 
the federal government was unnecessary following the Civil War, the 
Reconstruction-era amendments, and extensive Congressional debate 
surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment.88 The Court’s decision to 
rest its interpretation almost exclusively on the text—ignoring 
contextual
ious.89 
Buttressing his historical analysis, McDonald concluded his 
argument for overturning Slaughter-House by confronting the case on 
textualist terms.90 Slaughter-House’s crucial distinction between 
Article IV privileges and immunities of “citizens in the several states” 
and the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges or immunities of 
“citizens of the United States” was a difference without meaning, 
according to McDonald.91 McDonald points both to instances where 
Congress used the phrases interchangeably as well as an explicit 
rejection of the distinction by the Amendment’s primary author.92 For 
McDonald, this interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment privileges 
as synonymous with Article IV rights indicates a congressional intent 
that the Fourteenth Amendm
eral protection.93 
Finally, McDonald briefly suggested the Court incorporate the 
 87. Id. at 44. 
 88. Id. at 51–52. 
 89. Id. at 50. As McDonald noted, observers have been pointing out this issue since the 
19th century, when William Royall wrote: 
It is a little remarkable that, so far as the reports disclose, no one of the distinguished 
counsel who argued this great case (the Slaughter-House Cases), nor any of the judges 
who sat in it, appears to have thought it worthwhile to consult the proceedings of the 
Congress which proposed this amendment to ascertain what it was that they were 
seeking to accomplish. 
William Royall, The Fourteenth Amendment: The Slaughter-House Cases, S. L. REV. 558, 563 
(1879), quoted in Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 10, at 50. 
 90. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 10, at 53–54. 
 91. Id. at 53 (emphasis added). 
 92. Id. at 53–54 (“Bingham specifically rejected the construction SlaughterHouse [sic] 
placed on Article IV’s alleged language. ‘There is an ellipsis in the language employed in the 
Constitution, but its meaning is self-evident that it is the privileges and immunities of citizens of 
the United States in the several States’ that it guaranties.’”)(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 35th 
Congress, 2nd Sess. 984 (1859)). 
 93. Id. 
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under the Due Process right to privacy and personal integrity.98 
E.  
 
Second Amendment against the states through its existing due 
process framework.94 McDonald noted selective incorporation 
typically looks to the right’s “historical acceptance in our nation, its 
recognition by the states . . . and the nature of the interest secured by 
the right.”95 To demonstrate that the right to bear arms satisfies these 
requirements, McDonald first pointed to the “settled” determination 
under English law at the time of the Constitution’s ratification that 
colonial subjects had a right to bear arms for self-defense.96 Further, 
McDonald highlighted the states’ traditional acknowledgement of the 
right, emphasizing the fact that forty-four states currently codify the 
right to keep and bear arms in their constitutions.97 Finally, McDonald 
contended the right to self-defense inherent in the Second 
Amendment is a fundamental aspect of the liberty interest pro
Chicago’s Argument 
In contrast to McDonald, the City of Chicago divided its brief 
equally between due process and privileges or immunities.99 
Beginning with its privileges or immunities analysis, the City of 
Chicago urged the Court to reject McDonald’s argument for 
overturning Slaughter-House. Chicago based its argument on familiar 
stare decisis principles,100 arguing the Court should uphold Slaughter-
House because 1) the existing privileges or immunities jurisprudence 
is “clear and easy to apply”; 2) it is well-established case law; 3) much 
of the Court’s subsequent privilege or immunities and substantive due 
process decisions were founded on Slaughter-House; and 4) there has 
been no “erosion of legal and factual premises” underlying Slaughter-
House.101 Regarding the latter contention, Chicago emphasized the 
legal and factual foundation of Slaughter-House remains 
unchanged.102 Although most of the Bill of Rights has been 
incorporated through substantive due process, Chicago points out that 
 94. Id. at 66. 
 95. Id. at 67 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)). 
 96. Id. at 68. 
 97. Id. at 69. 
 98. Id. at 70–72 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), (recognizing 
personal autonomy in medical decisions); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), 
(recognizing right to purchase contraception as part of right of personal security); Rochin v. 
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), (recognizing right of bodily integrity against police searches)). 
 99. Brief for Respondents, McDonald, No. 08-1521 (U.S. Aug. 5, 2009). 
 100. Id. at 42. 
 101. Id. at 46–52. 
 102. Id. at 51–53. 
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ent, challenges to 
the
 
the Court has repeatedly emphasized the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause does not apply to state governments.103 In addition, Chicago 
argued the Court’s historical understanding 
ate around the Fourteenth Amendment remains unchanged.104 
Chicago also argued the Court should decline to overturn 
Slaughter-House even if reviewing the decision de novo —outside of 
the Cruikshank, Presser, Miller precedent where the Court previously 
held the Second Amendment did not apply to state governments.105 
First, Chicago pointed to the Court’s decision in Barron, in which the 
Court held that the term “privileges and immunities” did not apply to 
the states.106 To Chicago, widely recognized Supreme Court precedent 
demonstrated that, at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
passage, the general public did not understand the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause to bind the state governments.107 To these same 
ends, Chicago reiterated Slaughter-House’s guiding principle that if 
Congress had intended to work such a fundamental change 
use’s nature, the legislators would have explicitly done so.108 
Chicago started its substantive due process analysis by reminding 
the Court of Barron’s rejection of wholesale incorporation of the Bill 
of Rights. Chicago argued that the Court in Palko only intended for 
incorporation when a particular substantive right is “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.”109 Pointing to extensive handgun violence 
in urban areas like Chicago, the city argued prohibition or regulation 
of handguns preserves rather than hinders ordered liberty.110 
Incorporating the Second Amendment would endanger virtually 
every state-level gun regulation.111 Even if existing gun regulations 
were held constitutional under the Second Amendm
se laws would prove costly for states to litigate.112 
To demonstrate the fundamental changes that would result from 
incorporation of the Second Amendment, Chicago highlighted the 
differences between Heller’s application of the Second Amendment 
 103. Id. at 52. 
 104. Id. at 52–53. 
 105. Id. at 53. 
 106. Id. at 54. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 55–57. 
 109. Id. at 8 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
 110. Id. at 12–17. 
 111. Id. at 17–23. 
 112. Id. at 19–20 (explaining state governments would be forced to defend existing 
regulations against a new, federal cause of action). 
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tects handgun possession where other firearms are 
allowed.116 
trate why the right to bear arms does not advance ordered 
libe
 
to the federal government and the nature of existing gun rights 
embodied in state constitutions.113 In particular, Chicago emphasized 
Heller’s lack of an explicit level of review conflicts with the state-level 
“consensus” that any right to firearms is subject to a careful weighing 
of an individual’s interest in gun ownership against the government’s 
interest in preserving safety.114 Furthermore, state governments and 
local municipalities have occasionally banned handguns in certain 
areas while allowing possession of other firearms.115 This, according to 
Chicago, conflicts with Heller’s holding that the Second Amendment 
always pro
VI. DISPOSITION 
Chicago’s novel arguments against applying the Second 
Amendment to the states may eventually prove unpersuasive. First, 
the City misconstrues Palko’s “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty” standard.117 The Court’s substantive due process precedent 
seeks to place federal protection around rights inherent in all free 
societies.118 While a ban on handguns could prevent violence and 
therefore increase “order” in Chicago’s urban areas, Chicago fails to 
demons
rty. 
The Court might reject Chicago’s assertion that the historical 
record following Barron does not indicate a changed understanding 
of “privileges” and “immunities” such that the Clause now protects 
both fundamental rights and rights of national citizenship. The Court 
did not recognize a distinction between fundamental and national 
rights until the Dred Scott decision, twenty-four years after Barron.119 
 113. Id. at 24. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 26–30. 
 116. Id. at 26. 
 117. Id. at 8 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
 118. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (noting modern substantive due 
process doctrine rests on “the belief that neither liberty nor justice would exist if [the 
incorporated rights] were sacrificed”). 
 119. In Scott v. Sanford, the Court held: 
[N]o State, since the adoption of the Constitution, can by naturalizing an alien invest 
him with the rights and privileges secured to a citizen of a State under the Federal 
Government, although, so far as the State alone was concerned, he would 
undoubtedly be entitled to the rights of a citizen, and clothed with all the rights and 
immunities which the Constitution and laws of the State attached to that character. 
Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405 (1856). 
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Am
 that have not been 
cov
 the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause for their constitutional mandate. 
 
 
The subsequent Civil War and explicit rejection of Dred Scott in the 
Fourteenth Amendment indicate the popular understanding of the 
deference extended to states’ rights, including the Privileges or 
Immunities framework, 
endment’s adoption. 
The Court, however, might also find McDonald’s argument for 
reviving Privileges or Immunities unpersuasive. Even if the Slaughter-
House majority’s textualist interpretation was misguided and more 
weight should have been given to the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Congressional debate and historical context, the Court might not 
heed the legal academy’s persistent calls to overturn Slaughter-
House.120 Doing so would prioritize federal citizenship over state-level 
citizenship and fundamentally change the current federalism structure 
of our Nation’s legal system. The Supreme Court is unlikely to adopt 
a holding that would  radically change the federal-state balance of 
power. In the area of incorporation, the Court is even less likely to do 
so because modern, substantive due process review has extended 
federal protection to many fundamental rights
ered by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
The most likely outcome of McDonald will be incorporation of 
the Second Amendment under the Court’s existing due process 
jurisprudence. The Court might also provide an interest-balancing test 
for state courts to evaluate Second Amendment challenges to gun 
regulations.121 McDonald’s most lasting contribution might be to 
finally seal the fate of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or 
Immunities Clause. The Court will likely interpret the Clause much 
the same as Slaughter-House’s initial construction—as a protector 
solely of a very limited penumbra of rights inherent in federal 
citizenship. In the wake of McDonald, advocates for increased federal 
protection of fundamental rights will likely have to look outside
 120. See Brief of Constitutional Law Professors, supra note 23, at 1 (noting that there is “a 
remarkable scholarly consensus” that “the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was intended to protect substantive, fundamental rights”). 
 121. Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008) (declining to adopt a 
standard of review for federal gun regulations in spite of Justice Breyer’s requests for a test). 
